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I. INTRODUCTION
The West’s post-Holocaust pledge that genocide would never again be
tolerated proved to be hollow, and for all the fine sentiments inspired by
the memory of Auschwitz, the problem remains that denouncing evil is a
1
far cry from doing good.
There are acts so heinous as to constitute “the worst crime known to
2
humankind.” A crime that makes comrades out of the “unemployed, the
3
delinquents, and the gangs of thugs in the militia,” and exhorts them to
4
“exterminate the cockroaches” The plan was simple: “kill every Tutsi without
5
exception.”

1. PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR
FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA 170 (1998). In Article II of Genocide Convention, the crime of genocide is
defined as: “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group, such as: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and]
forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260, U.N. Doc. A/RES/260 (Dec. 9, 1948) (hereinafter “Genocide
Convention”).
2. Michael P. Scharf & Brianne M. Draffin, Foreword: To Prevent and to Punish: An International
Conference in Commemoration of the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Genocide Convention, 40 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 1, 1 (2007-2008) [hereinafter To Prevent and to Punish].
3. Hate Radio, RWANDAN STORIES, http://www.rwandanstories.org/genocide/hate_radio.html (last visited
Dec. 1, 2014).
4. See Russell Smith, The Impact of Hate Media in Rwanda, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/africa/3257748.stm (last updated Dec. 3, 2003) (detailing the incitement of genocide towards the Tutsis
using coded language).
5. A Simple Plan, RWANDAN STORIES, http://www.rwandanstories.org/genocide/simple_plan.html (last
visited Dec. 1, 2014).
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And, without exception, the machete wielding perpetrators hacked men,
6
women, and children to death. “Women were splayed on public roads” with
7
mutilated genitalia exposed. Tutsis attempting to flee were met with sudden
8
death when their identity cards were checked and seized at roadblocks. In the
aftermath, some 800,000 people (Tutsis and moderate Hutus) were massacred in
what the international community has come to recognize as the 1994 Rwandan
9
Genocide.
In response to the Rwandan Genocide, the United Nation’s Security Council
created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in November
10
1994, based in Arusha, Tanzania. In addition, domestic courts in Rwanda
11
launched prosecutions. In conjunction with domestic prosecutions in Rwanda,
community-based Gacaca courts addressed the backlog of domestic prosecutions
12
and tried suspects in villages throughout the country. But, how have the States
parties to the Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Genocide Convention) responded to the Rwandan Genocide in terms
13
of prosecution in national courts outside of Rwanda?
This inquiry is timely because “the mechanisms created to bring
14
accountability for the Rwandan Genocide are wrapping up their work.” As of
15
June 2012, the Gacaca courts finished their work, and the ICTR is scheduled to
16
complete its work by the end of 2014. Thus, domestic prosecutions for the
17
crime of genocide are increasingly important.

6. Susan Sontag, Preface to JEAN HATZFELD, MACHETE SEASON: THE KILLERS IN RWANDA SPEAK, vii
(Farrar et. Al. eds. 2005).
7. Nancy Sail, Rwanda, Women Under Siege (Feb. 8, 2012, 9:40AM), http://www.womenundersiege
project.org/ conflicts/profile/rwanda.
8. Roadblocks, RWANDAN STORIES, http://www.rwandanstories.org/genocide/simple_plan.html (last
visited Dec. 1, 2014).
9. Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1288230.stm (last
updated Dec. 18, 2008) (presenting an in-depth treatment on the causes of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide).
10. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). See also Karen Corrie, Beyond Arusha: The Global
Effort to Prosecute Rwanda’s Genocide, Comment to Voices, OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATION (Apr. 17, 2013,
10:20PM),
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/beyond-arusha-global-effort-prosecute-rwandasgenocide.
11. Corrie, supra note 10.
12. Id.
13. See generally id.
14. Id.
15. See Linda M. Keller, The False Dichotomy of Peace Versus Justice and the International Criminal
Court, 3 HAGUE JUST. J. 12, 41 (2008), available at http://www.issafrica.org/anicj/uploads/Keller_
Dichotomy_of_Peace _versus_Justice.pdf (arguing that alternative justice mechanisms can provide adequate
“punishment by incorporating local beliefs and customs as accountability measures for a larger number of
offenders.”). For a more in-depth treatment of the Gacaca trials see Linda E. Carter, Justice and Reconciliation
on Trial: Gacaca Proceedings in Rwanda, 14:1 NEW ENG. INT’L & COMP. L. 42 (2007).
16. Corrie, supra note 10.
17. Id.
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This Comment posits that there is a legal obligation under the Genocide
18
Convention to bring an end to impunity for the crime of genocide. To that end,
this article evaluates States parties’ (United States, Canada, France, and the
Netherlands) compliance with the ancillary obligations under the Genocide
Convention: enactment of legislation and punishment by way of persecution or
holding génocidaires accountable through extradition.
Part II of this Comment introduces the principle of universal jurisdiction as
applied during the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg
Tribunal). Part III provides a comparative study of the aforementioned States
parties’ paths towards ratification and enactment of domestic legislation to
implement the Genocide Convention. Part IV provides a case study of domestic
prosecutions in relation to the Rwandan Genocide. Part V provides an analysis of
political considerations, legal interpretations of international instruments, and
policies that may factor into States parties’ legal decisions to forego prosecution
under domestic laws criminalizing genocide. Part VI argues that employing
immigration remedies as a pretext for domestic prosecutions for the crime of
genocide minimizes the gravity of the crime of genocide. To that end, Part VII
evaluates the economic costs versus the societal costs of domestic prosecutions.
Lastly, Part VIII concludes that domestic prosecutions are a deterrence
mechanism that should be employed in the fight against impunity for the crime of
genocide.
II. THE CONCEPT OF GENOCIDE: FROM NUREMBERG TO PARIS
The concept of genocide is derived from the atrocities that occurred during
19
20
Nazi occupation of Germany. Genocide is a neologism coined by Raphael
Lemkin in 1944 by combining genos, the Greek word for race, and cide, the
21
Latin word for killing. Lemkin introduced the term in his book titled, Axis Rule
in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation – Analysis of Government Proposals
for Redress, which demonstrated profound foresight into the “darker purpose for
22
Hitler’s war.”

18. Juan E. Méndez, The United Nations and the Prevention of Genocide, in THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
GENOCIDE: INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE AND CONTEXTUAL ASPECTS 226, 226 (Ralph Henham & Paul
Behrens eds., 2007).
19. William A. Schabas, Origins of the Genocide Convention: From Nuremberg to Paris, 40 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L L. 35, 41 (2007-2008).
20. William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes (2000), http://catdir.
loc.gov/catdir/samples/cam032/99087924.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2014).
21. To Prevent and to Punish, supra note 2.
22. Michael Ignatieff, The Unsung Hero Who Coined the Term Genocide, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 21,
2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/114424/raphael-lemkin-unsung-hero-who-coined-genocide.
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Shortly thereafter, the term was included in the indictments during the
23
Nuremberg Tribunal; however, the term genocide was not included in the final
24
judgment. In fact, Henry T. King, Jr., a former war crimes prosecutor, recalled
that Lemkin “was very upset that the [Nuremberg Tribunal] did not go far
enough in dealing with genocide actions . . . because it limited its judgment to
25
wartime genocide and [excluded] peacetime genocide.” Lemkin’s displeasure
with the Nuremberg Tribunal’s judgment resonated with Cuba, India, and
26
27
China , three United Nations member states. Thus, a few days after the
Nuremberg Tribunal’s judgment was issued, on September 30 and October 1,
1946, the three member states proposed a resolution to include peacetime
28
genocide at the first session of the General Assembly. This resolution eventually
29
led to the adoption of the Genocide Convention. Hence, Lemkin is largely
30
recognized as the “Father of the Genocide Convention.”
A. Universal Jurisdiction under Customary International Law
The principle of universal jurisdiction is rooted in customary international
31
32
law. While Lemkin is recognized as the “Father of the Genocide Convention,”
the principle of universal jurisdiction, as it relates to the crime of genocide, can
33
be attributed to Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson. Justice Jackson
proposed the elimination of the defense of sovereign immunity and superior
orders, which later became a part of the London Charter of August 8, 1945 upon
34
which the Nuremberg trial was based. This recommendation led to the
35
“recognition of genocide as a crime against humanity.” Once genocide was
internationally recognized as a crime against humanity, Jackson advocated for
the principle of universal jurisdiction to hold those who carried out the genocidal

23. The Nuremberg International Military Tribunal was held from 1945 to 1949 and consisted of a series
of 13 trials conducted in Nuremberg, Germany, in an effort to bring Nazi war criminals to justice.
24. To Prevent and to Punish, supra note 2, at 1-2.
25. Schabas, supra note 19; Henry T. King Jr., Genocide and Nuremberg, in THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
GENOCIDE: INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE AND CONTEXTUAL ASPECTS 29 (Ralph Henham & Paul Behrens
eds., 2007).
26. As an aside, “In 1945, the leaders of the Nationalist and Communist parties, Chiang Kai-shek and
Mao Zedong, met for a series of talks on the formation of a post-war government,” but a civil war broke out in
1946. U.S. Dep’t of State, Milestones 1945-1952: The Chinese Revolution of 1949, http://history.
state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev (last visited Feb. 14, 2013).
27. Schabas, supra note 19.
28. Id. at 35-36.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 36-37.
31. Henry T. King Jr., supra note 25.
32. Schabas, supra note 19, at 36-37.
33. Henry T. King Jr., supra note 25.
34. Id. at 32.
35. Id. at 34-35.
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36

acts responsible. Although, the “concept of universal jurisdiction is long
standing in international law stemming from its application from the seventeenth
37
century onwards to pirates,” Jackson’s opening statement, in which he
38
announced that “the real complaining party at your bar is civilization,” made
39
universal jurisdiction “the most important principle derived from Nuremberg.”
B. The Genocide Convention: Universal Jurisdiction?
The concept of universal jurisdiction is essentially the “international
40
recognition of [an] offense that is of universal concern.” While, what constitutes
universal concern is debatable, as stated previously, universal jurisdiction has its
41
origins in piracy. By extension, genocide, like piracy, is an offense against the
42
law of nations. Furthermore, the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
recognizes that a State has “jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment
43
for . . . genocide, war crimes, and . . . terrorism.” Indeed, the United States has
invoked universal jurisdiction in the context of several of its criminal statutes.
For example, in the case of terrorism, the United States can exercise universal
44
jurisdiction over conduct that materially supports terrorism. Also, the
45
Convention Against Torture provides for universal jurisdiction.
Likewise, in practice, the principle of universal jurisdiction has been
46
exercised in criminal cases. In 1962, The Israeli Court sentenced Adolf
Eichmann to death for the crime of genocide on the basis of universal jurisdiction
upon rejection of his argument that Israel was not a state when the crimes were
47
committed. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals extradited John

36. Id. at 33.
37. Id.
38. King, supra note 25, at 33 (quoting Justice Jackson).
39. Id. (quoting Richard Goldstone, the first prosecutor at the Hague proceedings).
40. Zachary Pall, Note, The Genocide Accountability Act and U.S. Law: The Evolution and Lessons of
Universal Jurisdiction for Genocide, 3 INTERDISC. J. HUM. RTS. L. 13, 15 (2008-2009).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2008) (“Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the
law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life.”). See
also 18 U.S.C. § 1653 (2008).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2008) (provides that Congress may “define and punish Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.”).
43. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 404 (1987).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(d)(1)(C) (exercising universal jurisdiction when “after the conduct required for the
offense occurs an offender is brought into or found in the United States, even if the conduct required for the
offense occurs outside the United States.”).
45. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, arts.
5-8, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 115.
46. See cases cited infra note 47-48.
47. See The Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann, District Court of Jerusalem,
Criminal Case No. 40/61, Judgment (Dec. 15, 1961), I.L.R. 1968 §§ 19-21.
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Demjanjuk, an Ukrainian immigrant, who had become a naturalized United
48
States citizen, to Israel on the basis of universal jurisdiction for war crimes.
But, even supposing “that . . . genocide is an international crime so heinous
that [génocidaires] can be subject [to] trials in any court that is willing to take
49
jurisdiction over them,” the question remains whether the Genocide Convention
50
codifies the principle of universal jurisdiction. A textualist reading of the treaty
would conclude that the Genocide Convention did not contemplate universal
51
jurisdiction over acts of genocide. Article VI of the Genocide Convention
provides:
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in
article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the
territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal
tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting
52
Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, State parties to the Genocide Convention have roundly adhered
to the principle of universal jurisdiction, under customary international law, when
implementing legislation to give effect to the provisions of the Genocide
53
Convention.
III. A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON RATIFICATION OF THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION
AND IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION
Article V of the Genocide Convention provides as follows:
The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their
respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the
provisions of the present Convention, and, in particular, to provide

48. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985). The United States does not have a war crimes
statute. However, the Sixth Circuit found support in exercising universal jurisdiction in the Restatement of
Foreign Law. But, since the decision was later vacated, there are questions as to whether the reasoning in
applying universal jurisdiction is valid.
49. King, supra note 25, at 33.
50. For a more in-depth treatment of universal jurisdiction and the Genocide Convention see Zachary
Pall, Note, The Genocide Accountability Act and U.S. Law: The Evolution and Lessons of Universal
Jurisdiction for Genocide, 3 INTERDISC. J. HUM. RTS. L. 13-17 (2008-2009).
51. Pall, supra note 40, at 13-17.
52. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/260 (Dec. 9, 1948) (hereinafter “Genocide Convention”).
53. See infra Part III.
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effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts
54
enumerated in Article III.
Unsurprisingly, States have followed different paths in implementing
55
legislation criminalizing genocide. Ultimately, however, a survey of statutes
criminalizing genocide appear to affirm the broad acceptance of universal
56
jurisdiction over the crime of genocide. Indeed, universal jurisdiction is not
57
dependent upon the Genocide Convention, as a jus cogens crime it is subject to
58
universal jurisdiction just like piracy.
A. The United States’ Path Towards Ratification and Enacting Legislation
Implementing The Genocide Convention
The United States’ road to ratification of the Genocide Convention is long
59
and paved with apprehension. Although the United States was a signatory to the
Genocide Convention in 1948, the Genocide Convention was not ratified until
60
1988, after the passage of the implementing legislation.
There are several reasons why the passage of the Genocide Convention
languished for nearly forty years. The United States feared their racial policies
might be prosecuted as genocide, suspected that trials of service personnel would
be legitimized, and believed that the United States’ sovereignty would be
61
diluted. Thus, the United States registered the following reservations upon
ratification:
(1) That with reference to article IX of the Convention, before any
dispute to which the United States is a party may be submitted to the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under this article, the
specific consent of the United States is required in each case.

54. Reservations on the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A.
Res. 260, U.N. Doc. A/RES/260 (Dec. 9, 1948). (hereinafter “Reservations”).
55. There are four paths that States have followed in implementing legislation criminalizing genocide: 1)
passing no additional statutes to specifically address genocide; (2) criminalizing genocide and granting
jurisdiction over acts of genocide falling under the traditional bases of jurisdiction; (3) criminalizing genocide
and allowing jurisdiction where the accused is in the territory of the state; or (4) allowing universal jurisdiction
regardless of the location of the accused. Pall, supra note 40.
56. See infra Part III.B-D.
57. STEPHEN MCCAFFREY, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW ix (2006)
58. Méndez, supra note 18.
59. Pall, Note, supra note 40, at 13.
60. Id.
61. United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Treaties, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec (last visited Oct. 27, 2013)
[hereinafter Status of Treaties].
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(2) That nothing in the Convention requires or authorizes legislation or
other action by the United States of America prohibited by the
62
Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States.
As a consequence, the Lugar-Helms-Hatch Sovereignty Package
(Sovereignty Package), which weakened the Genocide Convention and
guaranteed that the United States maintained its full sovereignty, accompanied
63
the Senate ratification. The Sovereignty Package also required the passage of
implementing legislation before Congress would deposit the instruments of
64
ratification with the United Nations. The implementing legislation became
65
known as the Proxmire Act.
1. The Proxmire Act
As written, the Proxmire Act did not contemplate the exercise of universal
66
jurisdiction. Prosecution was only permitted when “the offense is committed
67
within the United States” or where “the alleged offender is a national of the
68
United States . . .”
2. The Genocide Accountability Act
In contrast, the Genocide Accountability Act of 2007 (GAA) expands the
jurisdictional reach of the Proxmire Act to where:
(3) the alleged offender is an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence in the United States (as that term is defined in section 101 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101)); (4) the alleged
offender is a stateless person whose habitual residence is in the United
States; or (5) after the conduct required for the offense occurs, the
alleged offender is brought into, or found in, the United States, even if
69
that conduct occurred outside the United States.
Thus, as written the GAA establishes “federal criminal jurisdiction over the
70
crime of genocide, wherever the crime is committed.”
62. Id.
63. Resolution of Ratification (Lugar-Helms-Hatch Sovereignty Package), S. Exec. Rep. 2, 99th Cong.,
1st sess. (1985).
64. Id.
65. Pub. L. No. 100-606 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1091).
66. Pall, supra note 40, at 23.
67. 18 U.S.C. § 1091(d)(1).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 1091(d)(2).
69. Genocide Accountability Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-151, 121 Stat. 1821.
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2008); Pall, supra note 40, at 25.
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B. Canada’s Path
71

Canada ratified the Genocide Convention on September 3, 1952. Unlike the
72
United States, Canada did not register any reservations. However, it was only as
recent as 2000 that Canada incorporated universal jurisdiction, as an over-arching
73
principle, over the crime of genocide into its domestic legal system. Under the
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act of 2000, Canada enjoys a broad
application of universal jurisdiction over any person who commits the crime of
74
genocide and is present in Canada, regardless of their nationality.
C. France
75

France ratified the Genocide Convention on October 14, 1950. While,
France, like Canada, has not registered a reservation or objection to the Genocide
76
77
Convention, its “position with respect to genocide is . . . rather paradoxical.”
For example, on March 1, 1994, France introduced Article 211-1 Code pénal to
penalize genocide which adopts a more objective criterion to the Genocide
Convention’s intent element, and enlarges the scope of the definition of
78
genocide. But, it appears at first blush that universal jurisdiction over the crime
79
of genocide is only applied in limited cases. In accordance with Article 113-6
80
every crime committed abroad by a French national is punishable in France.
Also, Article 113-7 permits the application of French law in cases where the
81
victim is of French nationality at the time of the violation. In summary, “France
has jurisdiction to prosecute acts of genocide committed abroad if the perpetrator
82
or victim have French nationality.” However, “in such cases, criminal

71. Status of Treaties, supra note 61; Canadian Heritage, GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, http://www.pch.
gc.ca/ddp-hrd/docs/treat-trait/un-eng.cfm#table1(last visited Feb. 2, 2014).
72. Status of Treaties, supra note 61.
73. Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act of 2000, SC 2000, c. 24 (Can), available at
http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/C-45.9.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2014).
74. Id.
75. Status of Treaties, supra note 61.
76. Id.
77. Caroline Fournet, Reflection on the Separation of Powers: The Law of Genocide and the Symptomatic
French Paradox, in THE CRIMINAL LAW OF GENOCIDE: INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE AND CONTEXTUAL
ASPECTS 212 (Ralph Henham & Paul Behrens eds., 2007).
78. Id.
79. See Jan Wouters & Sten Verhoeven, The Prosecution of Genocide–in Search of A European
Perspective, in THE CRIMINAL LAW OF GENOCIDE: INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE AND CONTEXTUAL
ASPECTS 200 (Ralph Henham & Paul Behrens eds., 2007) [hereinafter The Prosecution of Genocide].
80. CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art. 113-6 (Fr.).
81. Id. at art. 113-8.
82. The Prosecution of Genocide, supra note 79.
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proceedings can only be initiated by the public prosecutor, following a complaint
83
of the victim or his legal successor.”
Notwithstanding, Article 689 Code de Procédure Pénale allows for universal
jurisdiction over offenses committed abroad if the perpetrator can be found on
French territory, regardless of a link to France, providing that the international
84
conventions, to which France is a party, allows extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Although genocide is not enumerated in the conventions that are subject to
85
universal jurisdiction, under the framework of acts incorporating the United
Nations Security Council Resolution 827 and 955, creating the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and ICTR, respectively,
86
France can exercise universal jurisdiction over genocide
D. The Netherlands
87

On June 20, 1966, The Netherlands ratified the Genocide Convention.
Interestingly, the Netherlands registered objections to the United States
reservations concerning Article IX (submission to the International Court of
88
Justice). Thus, the Netherlands refused to recognize the United States as a party
to the Genocide Convention.
In terms of enacting legislation to implement the Genocide Convention,
Article 3, of the Dutch Law on International Crimes (Wet Internationale
89
Misdrijven) of June 19, 2003, closely aligns with the language of the Genocide
90
Convention and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article
2.a. permits the Dutch court to exercise universal jurisdiction over genocide
91
“when the alleged perpetrator is present on Dutch territory.”
92
But, even under Dutch law, universal jurisdiction has its limitations. For
instance, “Dutch courts will only prosecute if the alleged perpetrator cannot be
extradited to another country on whose territory the acts are committed or whose
national is the perpetrator or the victim of the crimes concerned or surrendered to

83. Id.
84. CODE DE PROCÉDURE PÉNAL [C. PR. PÉN.] art. 689 (Fr.).
85. The Prosecution of Genocide, supra note 79.
86. Id.
87. UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, Status of Treaties, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/View
Details.aspx?mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
88. Id. (Netherlands did not consider the United States, among other State parties, a party to the Genocide
Convention because of its reservations concerning Article IX. See also infra Part III.A.
89. Wet Internationale Misdrijeven, June 19, 2003, Staatsblad, 2003, No. 270.
90. The Prosecution of Genocide, supra note 79.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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93

an international tribunal.” Further, prosecution is under the sole discretion of the
94
prosecutor.
To be sure, this is not an exhaustive list of State parties that have ratified and
95
enacted legislation to implement the Genocide Convention. But, what emerges
from this brief comparative study is a consensus among State parties, at least
judging from the language of domestic legislation, that the principle of universal
96
jurisdiction should be applied to the crime of genocide. Thus, the central inquiry
is whether the aforementioned State parties to the Genocide Convention enforce
domestic legislation criminalizing genocide as a means to end impunity. In
answer to this question, case studies of recent cases involving the Rwandan
97
Genocide are presented below.
IV. CASE STUDIES: RWANDAN GENOCIDE CASES IN DOMESTIC COURTS
Whatever one’s position is regarding whether or not the Genocide
Convention codifies the principle of universal jurisdiction, States have
increasingly responded in the affirmative when one considers the enactment of
98
domestic legislation to implement the Genocide Convention. However, holding
persons accused of genocide accountable, under domestic legislation
criminalizing genocide, has yielded varying results. This section explores the
various cases brought before domestic courts.
A. The Netherlands: Universal Jurisdiction Not Retroactive?
In 1998, Joseph Mpambara, a Rwandese, applied for asylum in the
99
Netherlands. Mpambara was arrested on August 7, 2006, by Dutch authorities
100
under the principle of universal jurisdiction. Mpambara was “accused of
attacking a church, kidnapping, torture, and the murder of two mothers and their
four children in Rwanda.” While Joseph Mpambara was sentenced to 20 years

93. See the prepatory works of the Dutch Law on International Crimes in Memoire van Toelichting bij de
Wet Internationale Misdrijven, Kamerstukken II 2001-2002, 28 337, No. 3, p. 18.
94. The Prosecution of Genocide, supra note 79.
95. For a more exhaustive treatment on State parties that have ratified the Genocide Convention see
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, Status of Treaties, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec (last visited Oct. 27,
2013). See also The Prosecution of Genocide, supra note 79 (study on the practice of criminal jurisdiction over
genocide in seven EU member States); REDRESS/FIDH, Universal Jurisdiction in the European Union,
http://www.redress.org/downloads/conferences/country%20studies.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
96. See infra Part III.A-D.
97. See infra Part IV.
98. See infra Part III.A-D.
99. Joseph Mpambara, TRIAL, http://www.trial-ch.org/en/ressources/trial-watch/trial-watch/profils/
profile/757/action/show/controller/Profile.html (last visited on Feb. 12, 2014).
100. Id.
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imprisonment for torture on March 23, 2009, the Dutch court held that it had
102
no jurisdiction to try him for genocide. Similarly, the Dutch courts did not
103
found jurisdictional ground to prosecute Michel Bagaragaza.
In the
Bagaragaza case, the ICTR charged Mihcel Bagaragaza, the head of the entity
that controlled the Rwandan tea industry, with complicity in committing
104
genocide. The ICTR prosecutor sought to transfer the case to Norway after
105
Bagaragaza voluntarily surrender in 2005. But in the courts view original
jurisdiction did not lie because Dutch law did not provide for universal
106
jurisdiction over genocide at the time of the Rwandan genocide in 1994.
Finally, i+n the case of Yvonne Basebya, a Rwanda-born Dutch citizen, the
107
Dutch court prosecuted her as a Dutch citizen. Basebya was accused of inciting
“youngsters to commit murder against Tutsis during meetings, as evidenced by
the song she sang, ‘Tuba Tsembe Tsembe’, which means let’s exterminate them
108
all.” On March 1, 2013 the Dutch court convicted Basebya of inciting
109
genocide. As a consequence, Basebya was sentenced to six years and eight
110
months in jail.
B. France: A Slow Path to Prosecution
“France has been accused of being slow to prosecute those allegedly linked
111
to the genocide,” as evidenced in various cases. For instance, Laurent Serubuga
was arrested in July 2013, under an international arrest warrant issued by
112
Rwanda. The 77-year-old Hutu served as deputy army chief-of-staff during the

101. Chris Morris, Dutch court sentences Rwandan Hutu to Life in Prison over 1994 Genocide, JURIST
(July 7, 2011, 12:22 PM ET), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/07/dutch-court-sentences-rwandan-hutu-to-lifein-prison-over-1994-genocide.php.
102. Hague Court Finds Genocide Complaint Inadmissible, THE HAGUE JUSTICE PORTAL (Aug. 8, 2007),
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=8037.
103. Cedric Ryngaert, The Failed Referral of Michel Bagaragaza from the ICTR to the Netherlands, THE
HAGUE JUSTICE PORTAL (Oct. 14, 2009), http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=11116.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Dutch Court Hand Basebya Six Years for Genocide, THE NEW TIMES (Mar. 2, 2013), http://www.
newtimes.co.rw/news/index.php?i=15284&a=64478.
108. Id.
109. Karen Corrie, Beyond Arusha: The Global Effort to Prosecute Rwanda’s Genocide, Comment to
Voices, OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATION (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/beyondarusha-global-effort-prosecute-rwandas-genocide.
110. Dutch Court Hand Basebya Six Years for Genocide, THE NEW TIMES (Mar. 2, 2013), http://www.
newtimes.co.rw/news/index.php?i=15284&a=64478.
111. Rwandan Ex-spy Chief Tried in Paris on Genocide Charges, BBC NEWS, (Feb. 4, 2014, 11:04ET),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26030493.
112. Rwandan genocide: France to release suspect Serubuga, BBC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24064089.
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Rwandan Genocide. “Serubuga was part of a group of officers known as “The
Juvenal Habyarimana comrades of July 5, 1973,” who had helped him overthrow
114
former President Kayibanda.” As such, he was considered “one of the brains
115
behind the killings.” However, the court in Douai, France, ordered the release
116
of the suspect. The court’s rationale for its refusal to grant Rwanda’s
extradition request was due to the fact that genocide did not exist as a crime
117
under Rwandan criminal code at the time the atrocities occurred. Further, the
court found that the statute of limitations expired since the arrest warrant was
118
issued ten years after the alleged crimes. The judges did not indicate that the
allegations were baseless, but rather that the suspect would not be granted a fair
119
trial in Rwanda. Ironically, “France has repeatedly refused to extradite
Genocide suspects to Rwanda, but has sent some to Tanzania to face trial at the
120
ICTR. Yet, the ICTR has made transfers of genocide suspects to Rwanda.”
Prosecutors in the Serubuga case are seeking an appeal and express
121
frustration with the French law. Alan Gautier, the head of Collective of Civil
Parties for Rwanda, a French-based rights group, said it is the 15th or 16th time
122
that France had turned down an extradition to Rwanda. For example, “[t]he
Court of Appeal of Paris in 2011, rejected the extradition of Agathe
Habyarimana, the widow of the former Rwandan president Habyarimana. In
123
2010, it refused to extradite Eugene Rwamucyo, a Rwandan doctor.”
Notwithstanding, on November 13, 2013, a French Appeals Court finally
approved the extradition of both Claude Muhayimana and Innocent
Musabyimana for their suspected involvement in the 1994 Rwandan
124
Genocide. And as the twentieth anniversary of the Rwandan Genocide
approaches, France has begun its first trial. On February 4, 2014, Paul
Simbikangwa was accused of financing the genocide and inciting genocide
125
through radio and television broadcast. Soon thereafter, on March 14, 2014,
113. Id.
114. Edwin Musoni, Fury as France Releases Another Genocide Suspect, THE NEW TIMES, (Sept. 14,
2013), http://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/index.php?a=70423&i=15480.
115. Id.
116. Rwandan genocide, supra note 112.
117. Musoni, supra note 114.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Musoni, supra note 114.
123. Court in France orders release of man held in Rwandan genocide, CNN WORLD (Sept. 15, 2010),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/09/15/france.rwanda.release/.
124. Samuel Franklin, France Appeals Court Approves Extradition of Rwandan Genocide Suspects,
JURIST (Nov. 13, 2013), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2013/11/france-appeals-court-approves-extradition-ofrwanda-genocide-suspects.php.
125. Alexandria Sage, Rwanda genocide trial begins in French Court, Reuters (Feb. 4, 2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/04/us-france-rwanda-trial-idUSBREA130VC20140204.

372

Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 28
Simbikangwa was sentenced to 25 years in prison for his role in the 1994
126
Rwandan genocide.
C. Canada: To Extradite or to Prosecute
In its first Rwandan Genocide case, Canada chose to use immigration
127
remedies rather than domestic legislation criminalizing genocide.
Léon
Mugesera fled to Canada after an arrest warrant was issued by Rwandan
authorities for a speech that he gave in Kabaya before a 1,000 people, in his
official capacity as Vice President of the National Republican Movement for
Development and Democracy, “in which he threatened that Tutsis would be
128
forcibly returned to Ethiopia.”
On June 28, 2005, after several legal
proceedings in the lower courts, the Supreme Court of Canada ultimately found
that Mugesera was guilty of inciting genocide, and therefore, subject to
129
deportation under immigration statutes. Yet, Mugesera was not deported to
Rwanda until January 23, 2012, during which time authorities took to ascertain
130
whether deportation posed a risk to his safety. Finally, Musegera was charged
131
in Rwanda with genocide, incitement of genocide, and distribution of arms, and
132
his trial began in substance on January 17, 2013.
However, Canada has convicted a perpetrator of genocide under the Crimes
133
Against Humanity and War Crimes Act of 2000. Désiré Munyaneza was
accused of “committing murder, psychological terror, physical attacks and sexual
134
violence with intent to wiping out the Tutsi.” In 2009, “Munyaneza, a leader of
a Rwandan militia . . . , was the first person to be convicted under the Act, and
sentenced to life in prison for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
135
crimes.”
126. Kim Willsher, Rwandan Former Spy Chief Pascal Simbikangwa Jailed over Genocide, THE
GUARDIAN (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/14/rwanda-former-spy-chief-pascalsimbikangwa-jailed-genocide.
127. Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100, 2005 SCC 40.
128. Léon Mugesera, TRIAL, http://www.trial-ch.org/en/resources/trial-watch/trial-watch/profiles/
profile/696/action/show/controller/Profile/tab/fact.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2014) [hereinafter Léon
Mugesera]; Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100, 2005 SCC 40.
129. Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100, 2005 SCC 40;
Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2, s. 27(1)(a.1)(ii), (a.3)(ii).
130. Léon Mugesera, supra note 128.
131. Alysia Lau, Léon Musegera: A Lesson in Trying Judicial Deference, THE COURT BLOG, (Feb. 27,
2012), http://www.thecourt.ca/2012/02/27/leon-mugesera-a-lesson-in-trying-judicial-deference/.
132. Léon Mugesera, supra note 128.
133. Lau, supra note 131. See also Canadian Court Acquits Refugee Jacques Mungwarere of Genocide in
Rwanda, CTV NEWS, http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/canadian-court-acquits-refugee-jacques-mungwarere-ofgenocide-in-rwanda-1.1354895#ixzz2tFVxfCvP (last updated July 5, 2013) (“Jacques Mungwarere was found
not guilty Friday in Canada’s second trial under the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act”).
134. Désiré Munyaneza, TRIAL, http://www.trial-ch.org/en/resources/trial-watch/trial-watch/profiles/
profile/423/action/show/controller/Profile/tab/legal-procedure.html.
135. Lau, supra note 131.
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D. The United States: Immigration Fraud Cases
Analogous to Canada, the United States has approached Rwandan genocide
cases through immigration remedies. Thus, although the United States Congress
passed the GAA in 2007 with broad bipartisan support, the GAA, like its
136
predecessor the Proxmire Act, remains a sword in a sheath. The GAA attempts
137
to go where the Proxmire Act did not dare to in that it expands the U.S.
jurisdiction over genocidal actions committed by any perpetrator found in the
138
U.S.
However, the U.S. has been reluctant to exercise its expanded
139
Certainly, the opportunity to exercise jurisdiction
jurisdictional reach.
presented itself in 2009 when Lazare Kobagaya, a Wichita, Kansas man, was
140
accused of participating in acts of genocide in Rwanda.
141
Lazare Kobagaya was indicted in January 2009 for immigration fraud.
Although Kazare was accused of participation in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide,
142
he was indicted for lying on immigration forms. The charges alleged that
Kobagaya fraudulently stated on his visa application that he was living in
143
Rwanda until 1993, when the actual date he moved was in 1994. Kobagaya’s
attorney, Kurt Kerns, insists that his client was associated with the genocide in
Rwanda only after testifying on behalf of a former neighbor being tried for
144
genocide in Finland (the Francois Bazaramba case).
However, the Prosecutors contended that they had witnesses that insist that
Kobagaya worked in concert with Bazaramba in the planning and execution of
145
the killings. Further, the United States authorities stated in a letter addressed to
Finnish officials, requesting information on the Bazaramba case, that “witnesses
alleged that Kobagaya incited others to commit arson, assault and murder by

136. See generally Zachary Pall, Note, The Genocide Accountability Act and U.S. Law: The Evolution
and Lessons of Universal Jurisdiction for Genocide, 3 INTERDISC. J. HUM. RTS. L. 13 (2008-2009).
137. The Proxmire Act limited jurisdiction to crimes of genocide committed in the U.S. or by a
perpetrator that is a U.S. national.
138. See generally Pall, supra note 40.
139. Id.
140. Ron Sylvester, Case Dismissed Against Wichita Man Accused of Rwandan Crimes, THE WICHITA
EAGLE (August 25, 2011, 5:01PM), http://www.kansas.com/2011/08/25/1988025/prosecutors-dismiss-caseagainst.html.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. See also Finland Sentences Rwanda Preacher to Life for Genocide, BBC NEWS, (June, 11, 2010),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10294529 (case of Francois Bazaramba a Rwandan Baptist preacher was sentenced
to life in prison for the crime of genocide by a Finnish Court).
145. Sylvester, supra note 140.
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directing people to commit those acts and threatening those who tried to decline
146
to participate.”
Nonetheless, after two and a half years and over fifty witnesses brought from
147
Africa to testify, the case was dismissed on August 25, 2011. The Department
of Justice federal prosecutors filed a motion to dismiss the charges because they
148
failed to disclose a witness which would have been favorable to the defense.
The missing witness was a woman who processed Kobagaya’s visa in September
149
2008. The witness had informed the prosecutors’ investigators that discrepancy
in the move date on the visa application would not have resulted in a denial of his
150
visa application.
Recently, another case of immigration fraud involving the Rwandan
151
Genocide arose in New Hampshire. Beatrice Munyenyezi was convicted in
February 2013, “of entering the United States and securing citizenship by
masking her role as a commander of one of the notorious roadblocks where
152
Tutsis were singled out for slaughter.” The United States District Judge Steven
McAuliffe found that the “defendant was actively involved, actively participated,
in the mass killing of men, women and children simply because they were
153
Tutsis.” This ruling was supported by evidence that the defendant “checked
national identification cards at a roadblock in Butare, instructing Tutsis to sit and
wait for Hutu militia armed with machetes and crude garden tools to hack and
154
beat them to death.” Nevertheless, on July 15, 2013, the defendant was
sentenced to ten years in prison for immigration fraud and not for her role in the
155
Rwandan Genocide. Despite the prosecutors insistence on the maximum
156
sentence because “she is as guilty as if she wielded the machete herself,” the
157
GAA was never implicated in this case. So, although the Assistant United
States Attorney Aloke Chakravarty proclaimed that “tolerating genocide was not

146. Ron Sylvester, Case Linked to Rwandan Genocide has Wichita Lawyer Crisscrossing Africa, THE
WICHITA EAGLE, (April 11, 2010), http://www.kansas.com/2010/04/11/1264342/case-linked-to-rwandagenocide.html.
147. Sylvester, supra note 140..
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Lynne Tuohy, U.S. Woman Gets 10 years in Rwanda Fraud Case, USA TODAY (July 15, 2013),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/07/15/us-woman-rwanda/2518713/.
152. New Hampshire Woman Sentenced for Lying about role in Rwanda Genocide, DAILY NEWS, (July
16, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/nh-woman-sentenced-rwanda-genocide-role-article1.1399860.
153. Tuohy, supra note 151.
154. New Hampshire Woman Sentenced for Lying about role in Rwanda Genocide, supra note 152.
155. Id.
156. Tuohy, supra note 151.
157. See generally New Hampshire Woman Sentenced for Lying about role in Rwanda Genocide, supra
note152.
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an option,” the question remains whether immigration fraud is sufficient to
159
hold génocidaires accountable.
V. OBSTACLES TO DOMESTIC PROSECUTIONS OF GENOCIDE
This case study reveals the different legal mechanisms that have been
employed by some domestic courts in an attempt to hold génocidaires
160
accountable. However, in order to recommend a clearer path towards ending
impunity, it is important to understand the political considerations, legal
interpretations of international instruments, and policies that may factor into
State parties’ legal decisions to forego prosecution under domestic laws
criminalizing genocide. The following section explores these issues more indepth.
A. United States
In the context of political considerations in the prevention and punishment of
genocide, the thorny issue surrounding universal jurisdiction is the concept of
161
State sovereignty. A look at the United States policies from ratification to the
establishment of the ICC demonstrates the role politics have played in fashioning
policies on domestic prosecutions for the crime of genocide.
1. United States State Sovereignty Considerations in Ratification of the
Genocide Convention
The United States path towards ratification of the Genocide Convention was
laden with political posturing. The reason the Proxmire Act failed to contemplate
universal jurisdiction could best be explained by the lack of political will to
include universal jurisdiction in the Proxmire Act because of the political capital
162
gained from opposing the ratification of the Genocide Convention. In the mid1980’s, the terms in which the Genocide Convention were debated was largely
163
framed by Conservative groups such as the Liberty Lobby. The pro-sovereignty

158. Tuohy, supra note 151.
159. Rwandan officials have complained that genocide suspects are free to live in Europe and North
America because their requests to extradite suspects have been ignored. See Daniel Nasaw, US Government to
try African in Kansas on Rwanda-linked Charges, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 24, 2009), http://www.theguardian.
com/world/2009/apr/24/rwanda-genocide-us-trial-kansas.
160. Supra Part IV.A-D.
161. See U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.100 (1948) (United States and the Federation of Russia (formerly U.S.S.R
objections to universal jurisdiction)).
162. Pall, supra note 40, at 24.
163. Senator William Proxmire, Cong. Rec. 99th Cong. 2nd Sess., 1986, 132, pt. 15:S1355, quoted in
Samantha Power, A Problem From Hell 156 (2002) (“The only time we hear the Genocide Treaty brought up,
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voices were concerned with the dilution of United States sovereignty abroad.
Namely, “the perception that the U.S. would be subordinate to the International
Court of Justice or would be required to extradite accused American citizens for
165
trial in foreign courts.” Thus, the ratification included the Lugar-Helms-Hatch
166
Sovereignty Package.
Contrastingly, the Genocide Accountability Act of 2007 (GAA) passed with
167
very little fanfare. The 2006 elections ushered in Democratic Congressional
168
leadership, the status quo was challenged and the GAA was passed in 2007.
169
The GAA was introduced by Senator Dick Durbin (D-IL). The GAA garnered
significant bipartisan support, and it appears the fears around universal
170
jurisdiction did not rise to the forefront during the negotiations. This may be
due in part to the 2006 elections that left Democrats in control of both
171
chambers. Thus, legislative action on international human rights issues became
172
a possibility. Further, a lobbyist such as the Liberty Lobby who opposed the
173
ratification of the Genocide Convention no longer exists. Also, in the 1970’s
the American Bar Association went from opposing universal jurisdiction to being
174
a proponent. In addition, Senator Helms (R-NC), an arch-critic of the Genocide
175
Convention, has since retired.
But, what is more notable is the Republican co-sponsors of the GAA: Senator
176
Coburn (R-OK) and Senator Cornyn (R-TX). Their support may have been in
177
part because the GAA was presented as a minor amendment to existing law. In
addition, the support of the GAA may be due in part to tying the issue of Darfur
to jurisdiction over genocide for which conservatives expressed considerable
178
concern about the atrocities that were being committed in Darfur. Overall, the
179
passage of the GAA was a reality because of a combination of political factors.
it’s by intense, bitter people who know the treaty only through what they read in the Liberty Lobby’s Spot- light
or some publication of the John Birch Society”).
164. LAWRENCE J. LEBLANC, THE UNITED STATES AND THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 128 (1991).
165. Id. at 201-230.
166. Resolution of Ratification (Lugar-Helms-Hatch Sovereignty Package), S. Exec. Rep. 2, 99th Cong.,
1st sess. (1985).
167. Pall, supra note 40, at 26.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 24.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 25.
172. Pall, supra note 40, at 26.
173. Andrea Billups, Liberty Lobby goes under, ends Spotlight publication, WASHINGTON TIMES, (July
10, 2001), available at http://www.rense.com/general11/spot.htm.
174. Pall, supra note 40, at 25.
175. Id. at 26.
176. Id. at 25-26.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Pall, supra note 40, at 26.
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In comparison, as previously indicated, Canada and France did not register
180
reservations or objections to the Genocide Convention. While the Netherlands
did register an objection, it was in opposition to the United States isolationist
rhetoric as proposed in its reservations to Article IX of the Genocide
181
Convention. Thus, as a matter of sovereignty considerations, the United States
path towards ratification appears more politically calculated than the other State
182
parties that are the subject of this article.
2. United States’ Political Consideration in the Ratification of the Rome
Statute of the ICC
In fact, the political consideration around state sovereignty is further
183
reflected in the United States’ refusal to ratify the Rome Statute of the ICC. On
December 31, 2000, President Bill Clinton signed the Rome Statute of the
184
International Court on the last day it was open for signature. However,
President Clinton “did not submit the treaty to the Senate for advice . . . . because
185
he did not want U.S. citizens to be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court.”
Subsequently, President George Bush’s administration repudiated the signing of
the treaty declaring that the United States has no legal obligation under the
186
treaty.
While the United States has failed to sign or else re-sign the Rome Statute,
President Barack Obama’s administration has taken a more positive approach
187
towards the ICC. As a sign of diplomatic engagement, the United States has
participated “as an Observer in the meetings of the ICC’s governing body, the
188
Assembly of States Parties, since November 2009.” In addition, Ambassador
Susan Rice has acknowledged that the ICC is set to be a viable instrument to hold
189
senior leaders responsible for international crimes.

180. See infra Part III.A-D.
181. See infra Part III.A-D.
182. See infra Part V.A.
183. See supra Part V.A.
184. Aurélie Coppin, Status of the U.S. Signature of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, AMICC, available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/US_Signature.pdf (last updated Sept. 11, 2008).
185. Aurélie Coppin, Status of the U.S. Signature of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, AMICC, available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/US_Signature.pdf (last updated Sept. 11, 2008).
186. Id.
187. General Approach to the ICC, US & ICC: Administration Update, AMICC, http://www.
amicc.org/usicc/administration (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
188. Id.
189. Id.
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3. The Consequences of Pursuing an Isolationist Sovereignty Policy
The United States’ initial hostility towards the ICC and reservations in
regards to applying universal jurisdiction has not subsided with the passage of the
GAA. For while the passage of GAA purports to codify universal jurisdiction, the
impetus for its enactment appears to be for a limited purpose: the situation in
190
Darfur. As evidenced by the fact that the United States abstained from the vote
to adopt United Nations Security Council Resolution 1593, referral of the Darfur
situation to the ICC, instead of outright voting against the resolution because it
“was confident that the . . . resolution protected US nationals and members of the
armed services of other non-State Parties to the Rome Statute from the ICC’s
191
jurisdiction.”
The United States’ continued reluctance to apply universal jurisdiction over
the crime of genocide has left the federal judiciary bereft of a framework in
192
which to try genocide cases under its current law (GAA). Indeed, the Supreme
193
194
Court held in Medellin v. Texas and Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon that
“[n]othing in the structure or purpose of the ICJ suggests that its interpretations
were intended to be conclusive on our courts.” In addition, the international ad
hoc tribunals provide little guidance in terms of universal jurisdiction over the
195
crime of genocide. While it is true that the United States played a leading role
in designing and establishing the Nuremberg Tribunal, the ICTY, and the ICTR,
196
United States nationals and citizens of its allies were immune from prosecution.
Furthermore, ad hoc tribunals rely on cooperation from nation states to
197
successfully prosecute génocidaires, not universal jurisdiction.
Arguably, the United States has a federal judiciary that is competent to try
198
cases of first impression. Veritably, that is the position the United States
District Court found itself in when it tried Chuckie Taylor Jr. under the Torture
199
Victim Protection Act for the first time in 2009. The Torture Victim Protection
190. See 110 Cong. Rec. S.4149 (Mar. 29, 2007).
191. Zachary D. Kaufman, Sudan, the United States, and the International Court: A Tense Triumvirate in
Transitional Justice for Darfur, in THE CRIMINAL LAW OF GENOCIDE: INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE AND
CONTEXTUAL ASPECTS 51 (Ralph Henham & Paul Behrens eds., 2007).
192. See supra Part IV. and V.A-C.
193. 552 U.S., 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
194. 548 U.S. 331, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006).
195. See infra note 194.
196. Kaufman, supra note 191.
197. See, e.g., Press Release, Amnesty International, Liberia: New president Must act Now on Taylor,
Taylor’s Surrender to Special Court Critical for Justice, Rule of Law in West Africa (Jan. 27, 2006),
http://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/asset/AFR34/003/2006/fr/66775e7b-d464-11dd-8743d305bea2b2c7/afr340032006en.html (expressing expediency on the part of the Liberian president to request that
Nigeria surrender Charles Taylor to the jurisdiction of the Special Court for Sierra Leone).
198. See infra note 194.
199. Taylor’s Son Jailed for 97 Years, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7820069.stm (last
updated January 9, 2009).
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Act “criminalizes torture and provides U.S. courts jurisdiction to hear cases
involving acts of torture committed outside the United States if the offender is a
201
U.S. national or is present in the United States, regardless of nationality.” Thus,
it appears that the United States is not reluctant to exercise universal
202
jurisdiction.
But, to view Chuckie’s prosecution as a shift in the United States position on
exercising universal jurisdiction over jus cogens crimes is to misread the political
203
climate at the time of Chuckie’s conviction. The case involves a United States
204
citizen who is the son of warlord Charles Taylor Sr. Chuckie was taken into US
custody on March 30, 2006, a day after his father was surrendered for trial to the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, after attempting to enter the United States from
205
Trinidad at Miami International Airport. Unfortunately, at the time of
Chuckie’s arrest, Liberia did not have the judicial capacity to try serious crimes
after fourteen years of civil war; nor was there an existing international tribunal
206
mandated to prosecute past crimes.
As it were, the United States had a political interest in prosecuting Chuckie
207
Taylor. After the United States failed attempt to lobby members of the Security
Council to adopt a resolution to establish an ad hoc tribunal to address the
208
situation in Darfur, this may have been an attempt to undercut the ICC’s
209
legitimacy created by the precedent of referring the Darfur situation. At
minimum, it was an opportunity to add substance to the United States’ insistence
that it would hold its citizens accountable for violations of international law
through domestic legislation when it obtained exemption from the ICC’s
210
jurisdiction during the adoption of Resolution 1593. Thus, foregoing the
prosecution of Chuckie Taylor, a United States citizen, would have reinforced the
growing sentiment among the international community that the United States is
hypocritical in that it insists on shielding American citizens from being tried by
the ICC while simultaneously allowing the ICC to try other non-State parties
200. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (implements US obligations as a state party to the United Nations
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment).
201. Press Release, Department of Justice, Roy Belfast Jr. A/K/A Chuckie Taylor Convicted on Torture
Charges: Conviction Is First Under Torture Statute (Oct. 8, 2008) (on file with author).
202. Id.
203. See infra note 201.
204. Q & A: Charles ‘Chuckie’ Taylor, Jr.’s Trial in the United States for Torture Committed in Liberia,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 23, 2008), http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/09/23/q-charles-chuckie-taylor-jr-strial-united-states-torture-committed-liberia.
205. Id.
206. U.S. First Trial for Overseas Torture, Human Rights Watch (Sept. 23, 2008), http://www.hrw.
org/news/2008/09/23/us-first-trial-overseas-torture.
207. See infra note 206.
208. Kaufman, supra note 191, at 54-55.
209. See, e.g., Id.
210. Id.; Press Release, Security Council, Security Council refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan to Prosecutor
of International Court (Mar. 31, 2005), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8351.doc.htm.
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such as in the case of Sudan. Hence, the Chuckie Taylor Jr. case appears to be
an exception rather than an emerging trend.
B. Canada, France, and the Netherlands
In comparison, Canada, France, and the Netherlands have all ratified the
212
Rome Statute. But, arguably, at first glance ratification of the Rome Statute, or
the lack of reservations regarding sovereignty in the ratification of the Genocide
Convention, has not necessarily hindered or advanced the domestic prosecutions
213
for the crime of genocide. In fact, with the exception of the Netherlands,
214
domestic prosecutions are relatively on par. However, a deeper look into the
policy positions surrounding France’s misapprehension of universal jurisdiction
215
as announced during the Nuremberg Trials, or Canada’s de facto grant of
216
immunity to Nazi war criminals, illustrates the difficulty with which these State
217
parties have encountered in conducting domestic prosecutions for genocide.
1. Canada
History demonstrates that a failure to embrace universal jurisdiction, a norm
in international law, results in an inability to effectively deal with jus cogens
crime in general, and genocide specifically. The Finta case in Canada provides
an illustration. After World War II, Canada permitted immigrants suspected of
218
war crimes to take up residence and obtain citizenship. The Deschênes
Commission was established to conduct an enquiry into the accusations and
219
criticisms that Canada harbored Nazi War criminals. The report concluded that
220
744 persons guilty of Nazi war crimes were living in Canada. Therefore, the
Deschênes Commission recommended modifications to Canada’s criminal codes
221
and immigration statutes, to permit prosecution and extradition.
As a result, on December 1, 1987, Imre Finta was the first to be tried under
222
the new enacted legislation for war crimes. However, Finta was acquitted on all
211. Kaufman, supra note 191, at 57.
212. See Rome Statute Ratification Chart by Region, CICC, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=download
&doc=4352 (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
213. See supra Part IV.
214. See supra Part IV.
215. See infra Part V.B.2.
216. See infra Part V.B.1.
217. See supra Part IV.
218. Imre Finta, TRIAL, http://www.trial-ch.org/en/ressources/trial-watch/trialwatch/profils/profile/599/
action/show/controller/Profile/tab/legal-procedure.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2013).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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eight counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The newly enacted
legislation was a severe test for the judiciary, the trial judge guidelines for each
223
accusation were difficult to follow. The last appeal in 1994 resulted in a final
224
judgment and acquittal of Finta. The Finta trial left the Canadian government
225
skittish. Therefore, it developed a policy to pursue perpetrators of international
crimes through immigration remedies. It was only after the enactment of the
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act of 2000 that the Canadian
226
government resumed prosecution for international crimes.
2. France
As a result of misinterpreting the concept of universal jurisdiction for the
227
crime of genocide as presented in the Nuremberg trials, evidence demonstrates
that the French Courts have also experienced considerable difficulty conducting
228
domestic prosecutions for the crime of genocide. The Cour de Cassation’s
229
decision on December 20, 1985, in the Barbie case, interpreted the Nuremberg
definition Article 6(c), ‘within the jurisdiction of the tribunal,’ narrowly, in that it
230
only applied to Nazism. As a consequence, “no other crime could be qualified
as a crime against humanity, simply because it would necessarily be exterior, in
231
time and circumstance, to the European Axis Powers.” It was only after the
passage of the New Penal Code in 1994 that a crime could be classified as a
232
crime against humanity. Even still, acts conducted between 1945 and 1994
233
cannot be characterized as crimes against humanity. However, as stated
previously, the procedural law adopting the French legislation to the Security
Council Resolution 955 creating the ICTR provides the French courts with a
234
means in which to exercise universal jurisdiction over international crimes.

223. Imre Finta, supra note 218 .
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See Désiré Munyaneza, TRIAL, http://www.trial-ch.org/en/resources/trial-watch/trial-watch/profiles/
profile/423/action/show/controller/Profile/tab/legal-procedure.html.
227. See Jan Wouters & Sten Verhoeven, The Prosecution of Genocide – in Search of A European
Perspective, in THE CRIMINAL LAW OF GENOCIDE: INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE AND CONTEXTUAL
ASPECTS 200 (Ralph Henham & Paul Behrens eds., 2007).
228. See supra IV.B.
229. Klaus Barbie case (Chambre criminelle de la Cour de Cassation, judgment of 20 December 1985).
230. The Prosecution of Genocide–in Search of A European Perspective, in THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
GENOCIDE: INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE AND CONTEXTUAL ASPECTS 200 (Ralph Henham & Paul Behrens
eds., 2007).
231. The Prosecution of Genocide, supra note 79.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
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3. The Netherlands
In contrast, the Netherlands who registered strong objections and essentially
a rebuke to the United States, among other nation states, in regards to its
235
reservations on Article IV of the Genocide Convention, has effectively
236
conducted domestic prosecutions. This is not to suggest that the United States
should ratify the Rome Statue, but rather to underscore the difficulty domestic
courts have in prosecuting the crime of genocide when they equivocate on their
237
legal obligation.
For the “requirement of responsibility should clearly
encompass [States parties to the Genocide Convention] acknowledgment of the
238
crime of genocide, through its unequivocal prosecution and punishment.
VI. IMMIGRATION REMEDIES: A PRETEXT IN DOMESTIC PROSECUTIONS
FOR GENOCIDE
Equivocation on the legal obligation to prosecute the crime of genocide
results in fashioning policies that prefer pursuing immigration remedies as a
239
pretext in regards to the crime of genocide. On the one hand, pursuing
immigration remedies that results in extradition would meet the legal obligation
under the Genocide Convention. As a matter of fact, Article VII of the Genocide
Convention requires “Contracting Parties [to] pledge to . . . grant extradition in
240
accordance with their laws and treaties in force.” On the other hand, the
problem with charging persons accused of genocide with immigration fraud, as
opposed to the specific crime of genocide under domestic legislation, is that it
does not always result in extradition.
241
The Kobagaya case illustrates this point. The prosecutors aimed to
establish Kobagaya’s participation in the Rwandan Genocide through
immigration fraud by proving that Kobagaya lied on his visa application which
242
indicated that he lived in Rwanda until 1993 when he actually moved in 1994.
Thus, although the United States prosecution planned to use evidence and
witnesses to establish that Kobagaya participated in the Rwandan genocide,
243
Kobagaya was charged with lying to immigration officials not genocide.
235. See supra Part III.D.
236. See supra Part IV.D.
237. See supra Part IV.A-C.
238. The Prosecution of Genocide, supra note 79.
239. See supra Part IV.A-C.
240. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/260 (Dec. 9, 1948) (hereinafter “Genocide Convention”).
241. See supra III.A.
242. Ron Sylvester, Case Dismissed Against Wichita Man Accused of Rwandan Crimes, THE WICHITA
EAGLE, (August 26, 2011), http://www.kansas.com/2011/08/25/1988025/prosecutors-dismiss-case-against.html.
243. James McKinley Jr., In Kansas Courtroom, Echoes of Rwanda Genocide, THE NEW YORK TIMES
(May 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/09/us/09wichita.html?pagewanted=all.
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Consequently, the charges were dismissed when the prosecutors failed to disclose
a witness favorable to the defendant that would have testified that a change in
date would not have influenced the decision to approve the visa application.
Hence, the strategy of pursuing suspected génocidaires through immigration
244
remedies does not always result in prosecution or extradition.
Rwanda’s government drew a similar conclusion in regards to the
245
Munyenyezi case. When the New Hampshire judge declared a mistrial on
246
March 15, 2012 because the jury was deadlocked, Rwanda’s prosecutor
general, Martin Ngoga, stated that “Western jurisdictions [do not] understand the
247
gravity of the case before them.” He went on to say, “The cases are handled in
248
a very simplistic way.” According to Ngoga, “in the past [Rwanda] applauded
trials abroad because [it was believed] that they would substitute extradition,” but
249
that has not been the case. Thus, ultimately, immigration remedies, as a pretext
250
for prosecution of genocide appears to minimize the gravity of the crime.
VII. DOMESTIC PROSECUTION: COST ANALYSIS
While developing the framework to try genocide cases in domestic courts is a
necessary component towards ending impunity for the crime of genocide, there
are significant challenges in prosecuting human rights abuses committed
251
abroad. Conservation of legal resources is a serious consideration for national
252
judicial systems that cannot be easily dismissed. However, the economic costs
must be weighed against the societal costs of impunity. The following section
provides a cost analysis.

244. Sylvester, supra note 140.
245. See infra note 246.
246. On the Munyenyezi Trial, DEMOCRACY WATCH (Mar. 26, 2012), http://democracywatchrwanda2010.blogspot.com/2012/03/on-munyenyezi-trial.html.
247. Id.
248. Extradite Genocide Suspects or Drop InvestigationsCNgoga, THE NEW TIMES, http://www.
newtimes.co.rw/news/views/article_print.php?i=14936&a=51484&icon=Print (last visited on Feb. 13, 2014);
On the Munyenyezi Trial, DEMOCRACY WATCH (Mar. 26, 2012), http://democracywatch-rwanda2010.
blogspot.com/2012/03/on-munyenyezi-trial.html
249. Id; On the Munyenyezi Trial, DEMOCRACY WATCH (Mar. 26, 2012), http://democracywatchrwanda2010.blogspot.com/2012/03/on-munyenyezi-trial.html
250. Extradite Genocide Suspects or Drop InvestigationsCNgoga, THE NEW TIMES, http://www.
newtimes.co.rw/news/views/article_print.php?i=14936&a=51484&icon=Print (last visited on Feb. 13, 2014);
On the Munyenyezi Trial, DEMOCRACY WATCH (Mar. 26, 2012), http://democracywatch-rwanda2010.blogspot.
com/2012/03/on-munyenyezi-trial.html
251. Q & A: Charles ‘Chuckie’ Taylor, Jr.’s Trial in the United States for Torture Committed in Liberia,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 23, 2008), http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/09/23/q-charles-chuckie-taylor-jr-strial-united-states-torture-committed-liberia.
252. Id.
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A. Judicial Economy: The Price of Ending Impunity
Setting aside political considerations, legal misinterpretations, and policy
determinations that may present obstacles to domestic prosecutions, conservation
of limited resources of national legal systems may explain the apprehension to
253
prosecute suspected génocidaires under domestic laws criminalizing genocide.
Certainly, addressing issues such as “language barriers, the need to evaluate
complex and unfamiliar political and historical contexts, the difficulty of gaining
access to the necessary evidence, and risks to potential witnesses” come at an
254
economic cost.
255
This cost is reflected in the recent cases tried before domestic courts. The
256
Kobagaya case is a prime example. The cost of the trial was over $1 million
257
dollars. There is reason to believe the Munyenyezi case, which initially resulted
258
in a mistrial and then a subsequent conviction, was significantly higher in costs.
Conceivably, the fifteen-year fight to deport Léon Mugesera was a costly
259
endeavor.
But, there is nothing, by way of the facts, to suggest that the cost of litigation
would dramatically increase for prosecutions brought under domestic laws
criminalizing genocide. Indeed, since immigration fraud cases are a mere pretext
to prosecutions for the crime of genocide, the same evidence to prove genocide is
proffered. “In the Kobagaya case, American prosecutors [used] witness
statements and evidence collected by the Finnish government against Francois
260
Bazaramba.” The witnesses in the Munyenyezi case consisted of “experts on the
261
genocide, who gave details of the violence, and residents of Butare. Finally, in
the Mugesera case, Canadian prosecutors lined up twenty-eight witnesses to
262
testify regarding Mugesera’s involvement in the Rwandan Genocide. Hence,

253. See supra V.
254. Q & A: Charles ‘Chuckie’ Taylor, Jr.’s Trial in the United States for Torture Committed in Liberia,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 23, 2008), http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/09/23/q-charles-chuckie-taylor-jr-strial-united-states-torture-committed-liberia.
255. See supra V.
256. See supra III.A.
257. Ron Sylvester, Case Dismissed Against Wichita Man Accused of Rwandan Crimes, THE WICHITA
EAGLE, (August 26, 2011), http://www.kansas.com/2011/08/25/1988025/prosecutors-dismiss-case-against.html.
258. See supra V.C.
259. Leon Mugesera, TRIAL, http://www.trial-ch.org/en/resources/trial-watch/trial-watch/profiles/
profile/696/action/show/controller/Profile/tab/fact.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
260. Daniel Nasaw, US Government to try African in Kansas on Rwanda-linked Charges, THE GUARDIAN
(Apr. 24, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/24/rwanda-genocide-us-trial-kansas.
261. Tom Haines, Did This New Hampshire Woman Take Part in the Rwandan Genocide?, THE
ATLANTIC (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/02/did-this-new-hampshirewoman-take-part-in-the-rwandan-genocide/273328/
262. Ostine Arinaitwe Gashugi, Rwanda: Witness Pins Mugesera On Infamous Speech, ALLAFRICA (Oct.
30, 2013), http://allafrica.com/stories/201311010098.html.
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there are no economic savings to be garnered in pursuing immigration remedies
263
as opposed to prosecutions under domestic criminal statutes.
B. Societal Costs: Impunity for the Crime of Genocide
A candle was lit at the genocide memorial in Kigali on January7, 2014,
during commemorations marking the 20th Anniversary of the Rwandan
264
Genocide. The flame will be carried by young people. Young people who
265
became heads of households when their parents were massacred during the 90
days of genocidal hell.
Since the 1994 Genocide, a new word has appeared in the Rwandan
vocabulary to describe the psychological manifestations of the children who are
266
victims of the genocide: Ihahamuka. The term Ihahamuka joins two words:
267
haha, which means lungs or respiration, and Muka, which means without. In
fact, “genocide is one of the most pressing threats to the health of populations in
268
the twenty-first century.” Genocidal violence produces mortality rates that far
exceed “other public health emergencies including malaria and HIV/AIDS.”
Unsurprisingly, “the impact of genocide on local health economies is
catastrophic, and the opportunity costs of diverting scarce global health dollars
269
toward ameliorating genocide related outcomes are substantial.” Thus, the
societal costs of impunity, which includes economic costs, surpasses the
270
economic costs of prosecution.
Despite the international community’s affirmation in 1948 that “genocide is a
crime under international law . . . .and condemned by the civilized world,”
mankind has yet to be liberated from its odious scourge. There are significant
societal costs to bear when State parties to the Genocide Convention fail to live
271
up to their legal obligation to prevent and punish the crime of genocide. As
such, State parties should adhere to one of the foremost basic principles of

263. See supra V.
264. Rwanda Marks 2oth Anniversary of Genocide, THE INDEPENDENT (Jan 13, 2014),
http://www.independent.co.ug/rwanda-ed/rwanda/8603-rwanda-marks-20th-anniversary-of-genocide.
265. Rwanda: Ten Years After Genocide, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/rwanda_
genocide.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Reva N. Adler et. al., To Prevent, React, and Rebuild: Health Research and the Prevention of
Genocide, NIC, available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1361111/ (last visited Feb. 14,
2014).
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. See Athanase Hagengimana, After Genocide in Rwanda: Social and Psychological Consequences,
INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF GENOCIDE, http://www.instituteforthestudyofgenocide.org/oldsite/newsletters/
25/athanse.html (last visited on Feb. 14, 2014).
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criminal law: punishment as means of deterrence. Thus, the punishment of the
crime must meet the gravity of the offense in order to deter would be
273
génocidaires. As it stands, immigration fraud, while morally questionable, is an
274
insufficient tool in the fight against impunity for genocide. The crime among
275
all crimes necessitates a punishment that carries a stigma. Therefore, State
parties should prosecute genocide suspects under their existing domestic laws
criminalizing genocide.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Finally, the adoption of the Genocide Convention was the first and necessary
276
step in denouncing the crime of genocide. However, post-Nuremberg, State
parties have equivocated on the application of universal jurisdiction for the crime
277
of genocide. This equivocation has led to pursing policies that undermine the
278
fight against impunity in two central ways. First, State parties have struggled
with developing a framework in which to effectively prosecute perpetrators of
279
genocide in domestic courts. Second, equivocation on the principle of universal
jurisdiction has caused State parties to fashion immigration remedies that are
280
inadequate to address the crime of genocide. In the final cost analysis, the
societal cost in allowing impunity for genocide far out-weighs the financial cost
281
of prosecuting génocidaires in domestic courts. Thus, State parties must adhere
to the basic principles of criminal law, deterrence, and prosecute génocidaires,
282
specifically for genocide, in order to end impunity for the crime of genocide.
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